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ABSTRACT
This is the second chapter of two on military human enhancement. In the first chapter, the authors outlined
past and present efforts aimed at enhancing the minds and bodies of our warfighters with the broader
goal of creating the “super soldiers” of tomorrow, all before exploring a number of distinctions—natural vs. artificial, external vs. internal, enhancement vs. therapy, enhancement vs. disenhancement, and
enhancement vs. engineering—that are critical to the definition of military human enhancement and
understanding the problems it poses. The chapter then advanced a working definition of enhancement
as efforts that aim to “improve performance, appearance, or capability besides what is necessary to
achieve, sustain, or restore health.” It then discussed a number of variables that must be taken into
consideration when applying this definition in a military context. In this second chapter, drawing on
that definition and some of the controversies already mentioned, the authors set out the relevant ethical,
legal, and operational challenges posed by military enhancement. They begin by considering some of
the implications for international humanitarian law and then shift to US domestic law. Following that,
the authors examine military human enhancement from a virtue ethics approach, and finally outline
some potential consequences for military operations more generally.
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6010-6.ch008
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INTRODUCTION
With the background and working definition
provided in the previous chapter (Chapter 7), we
begin our discussion of the primary ethical, legal
and operational issues associated with military
human enhancement. At this point, it must be
said that to the extent that ethics underwrites
law and policy, we are often better placed to
understand the former by looking at the latter as
the real-world implementation of ethics. This is
also beneficial in the sense that international and
domestic law—including laws relevant to biomedical enhancement—may demand immediate
attention, with potential humanitarian concerns or
the possibility of requiring serious sanctions. We
therefore adopt the approach of focusing first on
legal problems that are generated or exacerbated
by military human enhancement.
However, the discussion does not end there.
We also sketch a range of other considerations,
both explicitly philosophical in nature, as well
as some affecting more operational concerns.
While certain of these latter considerations are
not as likely to lead to direct physical harm to
subjects and may seem somewhat abstract, these
matters remain of great importance to the moral
foundations of military service and the relationship
between citizens, states, and their military institutions. Also, even though all of these considerations
are in some sense intertwined, we separate them
here as best as we can for ease of presentation
and comprehension.

INTERNATIONAL LAW
What are the provisions in international law that
may bear upon military human enhancements?
Should enhancement technologies, which typically
do not directly interact with anyone other than
the human subject, nevertheless be subjected to
a weapons legal review? That is, is there a sense
in which enhancements could be considered as
“weapons” and therefore subject to legal instru140

ments such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention? How do norms related to humansubject research and medical ethics impact military
enhancements?
These are some of the most important questions for military enhancements as they relate to
international law (Lin, 2012a). Conceptually, we
divide international law into two categories: the
first is commonly known as the Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC) and the second is composed of
international agreements related to biomedical
research. Because these are well-known conventions, we will only list them here and add more
detail later as needed.
Under international humanitarian law (IHL),
the main instruments of interest here are:
•
•
•
•
•

Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907).
Geneva Conventions (1949 and Additional
Protocols I, II, and III).
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(1972).
Chemical Weapons Convention (1993).
Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (1998).

Under international biomedical laws—which
we discuss more in the next section—the main
instruments of interest here are:
•
•
•

Nuremberg Code (1947).
Declaration of Geneva (1948).
Declaration of Helsinki (1964).

As it concerns new technologies, Article 36
of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol
I, specifies that: “in the study, development,
acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means
or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party
is under an obligation to determine whether its
employment would, in some or all circumstances,
be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other
rule of international law applicable to the High
Contracting Party” (1977).
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But does Article 36 apply to human enhancement technologies? That is, should they be considered as a “weapon” or “means or method of
warfare” in the first place? Unlike other weapons
contemplated by the LOAC, enhancements usually
do not directly harm others, so it is not obvious that
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I would apply
here. If anyone’s safety were immediately at risk, it
would seem to be that of the individual warfighter,
thereby turning the debate into one about bioethics. To that extent, warfighters, whether enhanced
or not, are not weapons as typically understood.
Yet in a broader sense, the warfighter is not
only a weapon but also perhaps a military’s best
and oldest weapon. Warfighters carry out missions,
they sometimes kill enemies, and they represent
one of the largest expenditures or investments
of a military. They have cognitive and physical
capabilities that no other technology currently
has, and this can make them ethical, lethal, and
versatile. The human fighter, engaged in hand-tohand combat, would be the last remaining weapon
when all others have been exhausted. So in this
basic sense, the warfighter is undeniably a weapon
or instrument of war.
Still, should Article 36 be interpreted to include
warfighters themselves as weapons subject to
regulation? There could be several reasons to think
so. First, other organisms are plausibly weapons
subject to an Article 36 review. Throughout history,
humans have employed animals in the service of
war, such as dogs, elephants, pigeons, sea lions,
dolphins, and possibly rhinoceroses (Knights,
2007; Beckhusen, 2012; US Navy, 2012). Dogs,
as the most commonly used animal, undergo
rigorous training, validation, and inspections (US
Department of the Army, 2005). If a military were
to field a weaponized rhino in an urban battlefield
that contains innocent civilians, we would be
reasonably worried that the war-rhino does not
comply with Article 36, if rhinos cannot reliably
discriminate friends from foe, e.g., a rhino may
target and charge a noncombatant child in violation
of the principle of distinction. A similar charge

would apply to autonomous robots in such a general
environment in which distinction is important,
as opposed to a “kill box” or area of such fierce
fighting that all noncombatants could be presumed
to have fled (Lin, et al., 2008).
If autonomous robots are clearly regulatable
weapons, then consider the spectrum of cyborgs—
part-human, part-machine—that exists between
robots and unenhanced humans. Replacing one
body part, say a human knee, with a robotic part
starts us on the cybernetic path. And as other
body parts are replaced, the organism becomes
less human and more robotic. Finally, after (hypothetically) replacing every body part, including
the brain, the organism is entirely robotic with no
trace of the original human. If we want to say that
robots are weapons but humans are not, then we
would be challenged to identify the point on that
spectrum at which the human becomes a robot or
a weapon. The inability to draw such a line may
not be a fatal blow to the claim that humans should
be treated as weapons; after all, we cannot draw a
precise line at which a man who is losing his hair
becomes “bald,” yet there is clearly a difference
between a bald man and one who has a head full
of hair (Stanford, 2011). But a simpler solution
may be to say that humans are weapons, especially
given the reasons offered previously.
As it applies to military enhancements, integrated robotics may be one form of enhancement,
but we can also consider scenarios involving biomedical enhancements such as pharmaceuticals
and genetic engineering. Again, on one end of
the spectrum would stand a normal, unenhanced
human. One step toward the path of being fully
enhanced may be a warfighter who drinks coffee
or pops amphetamines (“go pills”) as a cognitive stimulant or enhancer. Another step may be
taking drugs that increase strength, erase fear, or
eliminate the need for sleep. At the more radical
end may be a warfighter so enhanced that s/he no
longer resembles a human being, such as a creature
with four muscular arms, fangs, fur, and other
animal-like features, and with no moral sense of
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distinguishing combatant from noncombatant. If a
war-rhino should be subject to Article 36, then so
should this radically enhanced human animal, so
it would seem. And to avoid the difficult question
of drawing the line at which the enhanced human
becomes a weapon, a more intuitive position would
be that the human animal is a weapon all along,
at every point in the spectrum, especially given
the previous reasons that are independent of this
demarcation problem.
If we agree that enhanced human warfighters
could conceivably be weapons subject to Article
36, what are the implications? Historically, new
weapons and tactics needed to conform to at least
the following:
•
•
•

Principle of distinction.
Principle of proportionality.
Prohibition on superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering (SIrUS).

To explain: First, the principle of distinction
demands that a weapon must be discriminating
enough to target only combatants and never
noncombatants (Geneva Additional Protocol I,
1977; Sassòli, 2003). Biological weapons and
most anti-personnel landmines, then, are indiscriminate and therefore illegal in that they cannot
distinguish whether they are about to infect or
blow up a small child versus an enemy combatant. Unintended killings of noncombatants—or
“collateral damage”—may be permissible, but
not their deliberate targeting; but to the extent
that biological weapons today target anyone, they
also target everyone. However, a future biological
weapon, e.g., a virus that attacks only blue-eyed
people or a certain DNA signature (Hessel et al.,
2012), may be discriminate and therefore would not
violate this principle (but it could violate others).
Second, the principle of proportionality demands that the use of a weapon be proportional to
the military objective, so to keep civilian casualties to a minimum (Geneva Additional Protocol
I, 1977; Cohen, 2010). For instance, dropping a
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nuclear bomb to kill a hidden sniper would be
a disproportionate use of force, since other less
drastic methods could have been used.
Third, the SIrUS principle is related to proportionality in that it requires methods of attack to
be minimally harmful in rendering a warfighter
hors de combat or unable to fight (Coupland &
Herby, 1999). This prohibition has led to the ban
of such weapons as poison, exploding bullets,
and blinding lasers, which cause more injury or
suffering than needed to neutralize a combatant.
However implausible, we can imagine a human
enhancement that violates these and other provisions—for instance, a hypothetical “berserker”
drug would likely be illegal if it causes the warfighter to be inhumanely vicious, aggressive, and
indiscriminate in his attacks, potentially killing
children. For the moment, we will put aside enhancements that are directed at adversaries, such
as a mood-enhancing gas to pacify a riotous crowd
and a truth-enhancing serum used in interrogations; the former would be prohibited outright by
the Chemical Weapons Convention in warfare
(The Royal Society, 2012), partly because it is
indiscriminate, and the latter may be prohibited by
laws against torturing and mistreating prisoners of
war. The point here is that it is theoretically possible, even if unlikely, for a human enhancement
to be in clear violation of IHL.

DOMESTIC LAW
The international law considerations adduced
above primarily involve what militaries should
(not) do with their enhanced warfighters, but
there remains a prior question of whether militaries are permitted to enhance their personnel
at all. Traditionally, this has been a question for
bioethics and related domestic law, rather than for
IHL. Hence, we will briefly outline some key US
domestic laws and regulations that would apply
to military enhancements.
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Does US domestic law allow the military to
require enhancements for its own personnel? To
answer that question, we look at actual legal cases
in the US that are closely related to, if not directly
about, questions about human enhancements.
While we had excluded vaccinations as a type of
human enhancement in the definitional section of
the previous chapter— because they are designed
to sustain health, not provide capabilities beyond
it—we also acknowledged that this understanding
was contentious: in a sense, a vaccination seems
to be an enhancement of the immune system, especially considering that the patient is not sick at
the time of the immunization. At the least, even if
not enhancements themselves, vaccination policy
can inform a study on how US law might deal
with military enhancements.
The us military has been vaccinating troops
since 1777 (Gabriel, 2013). There are currently
thirteen vaccinations used by the military mandated for trainees alone: mandatory vaccinations
include influenza, hepatitis a and b, measles, poliovirus, rubella, and yellow fever, among others
(Grabenstein, 2006). The standard military policy
for the mandatory administration of pharmaceutical agents is the same as the policy applied to
civilians (Russo, 2007): pharmaceuticals need to
be approved by the us food and drug administration (FDA) for their intended use before they are
mandatorily administered; and absent FDA approval, a presidential waiver or informed voluntary
consent must be obtained for the administration
of an investigational drug (IND) (Russo, 2007).
The US Supreme Court has held that mandatory
vaccinations of FDA-approved drugs do not violate
the US Constitution (Jacobson v. Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, 1905). Mandatory vaccination
programs in the military have been challenged in
court (United States v. Chadwell, 1965), but they
were rarely subjected to substantial legal challenges until 2001, directed at the anthrax vaccine
immunization program (AVIP).

Federal Law
As an important catalyst for us law related to
vaccinations, AVIP—established in 1997—had
roots in operation desert shield in 1990, at which
time the US military worried about biological
and chemical weapons that Saddam Hussein was
rumored to have possessed. At the time, the DOD
argued that the informed consent requirement
for the administration of INDs was impractical
(Doe v. Sullivan, 1991). The requirement was
feasible during peacetime, but the DOD urged
that it posed significant obstacles to the safety of
troops and mission accomplishment in wartime
(Brown, 2006). In response to pressure from the
DOD, the FDA promulgated rule 23(d), otherwise
known as the interim final rule:
•

21 CFR 50.23(d), or Interim Final Rule.

Rule 23(d) allows the DOD to waive the informed
consent requirement, if it is not feasible to obtain
consent in a particular military operation, subject
to conditions (Brown, 2006). Most importantly,
the waiver must be limited to “a specific military
operation involving combat or the immediate
threat of combat” (Doe v. Sullivan, 1991). Upon
receiving the request for waiver from the DOD, the
FDA must evaluate it and grant the waiver “only
when withholding treatment would be contrary to
the best interests of military personnel and there
is no available satisfactory alternative therapy”
(doe v. Sullivan, 1991). This rule was challenged in
1991, in doe v. Sullivan, but the federal court held
that 23(d) was constitutional and within the scope
of the FDA’s authority (Doe v. Sullivan, 1991).
•

10 USC §1107(f).

In 1998, in response to the ruling in Doe v. Sullivan,
the US Congress enacted 1107(f). This statutory
provision requires the DoD to obtain informed
consent from soldiers before administering an
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IND (including an approved drug for an unapproved use) and provides that the President can
waive said requirement (10 USCA § 1107 (West)).
•

Executive Order 13139.

President Clinton unified both rule 23(d) and
1107(f) in 1999 with executive order 13139, a
guideline for waiving informed consent within
the context of military operations (brown, 2006).
According to the order, to use an “investigational
drug” or a “drug unapproved for its intended use,”
the Secretary of Defense must obtain informed
consent from each individual service member
(executive order no. 13139 1999). However, a
presidential waiver can overcome this requirement, but it can only be obtained upon a written
determination that obtaining consent is: (1) not
feasible; (2) contrary to the best interests of the
member; or (3) is not in the interests of national
security (executive order no. 13139 1999).
•

DoDD 6200.2.

The department of defense directive (DODD)
6200.2, like executive order 13139, synthesized
several sources of authority governing the use
of INDs for military health protection (US Dept.
of Defense, 2012). It defines an IND as a “drug
not approved or a biological product not licensed
by the FDA,” or alternatively, as a “drug unapproved for its applied use” (US Dept. of Defense,
2012). Further, it provides that the DOD must
prefer products approved by the FDA for use as
countermeasures to INDs (US Dept. of Defense,
2012). However, “when, at the time of the need
for a force health care protection counter-measure
against a particular threat, no safe and effective
FDA-approved drug or biological product is available, DOD components may request approval of
the secretary of defense to use an investigational
new drug” (US Dept. of Defense, 2012). If the
secretary of defense determines that obtaining
informed consent is not feasible, contrary to
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the best interests of the member, and is not in
the interests of national security, s/he can then
request a waiver from the president (US Dept. of
Defense, 2012).

Military Law
Military law operates in conjunction with federal
civil law, but it focuses on matters germane to the
military alone. In addition to the constitution, us
military law is governed by the uniform code of
military justice (UCMJ). In the context of military
vaccinations, the issue is about the lawfulness of
the order to take the vaccination. The DOD’s successful defense strategy of the legality of the AVIP
throughout the anthrax cases was straightforward
on this account: the vaccine was determined by
the FDA to be safe and effective for use against
inhalation anthrax, and under military law the
legality of an order to take the vaccine was a question of law for a judge to decide, not a question
of fact for determination by a jury (Katz, 2001).
Under the UCMJ, disobedience of a direct and
lawful order from a superior officer is punishable
under articles 90 or 92. Article 90 prohibits willfully disobeying a superior commissioned officer
(10 USC § 890 (1994) (UCMJ art. 90)), and article
92 prohibits failing to obey an order or regulation
(10 USC § 890 (1994) (UCMJ art. 92)). A soldier
who refused to take the anthrax vaccination was
court-martialed, where the DOD would file two
interlocutory motions: (1) that the lawfulness of
the order should be decided as a question of law;
and (2) that all the evidence regarding the safety,
efficacy, and necessity of the vaccine should be
excluded because the legal authority of an order is
not based on the safety of the vaccine (ponder v.
Stone 2000). The DOD did this in every challenge
to the AVIP, and in every challenge to the AVIP in
military court they were successful (Katz, 2001).
A strong, but rebuttable, presumption is that a
military order is lawful when someone is charged
with willful disobedience of a lawful order (US
government, manual for court-martial, 2010; Katz,
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2001), and the lawfulness of a military order is an
interlocutory order to be decided on by a judge, not
a jury (us v. New, 1999; Perry v. Wesely, 2000).
What this effectively does is foreclose a legal
challenge to the scientific efficacy of a vaccine
on procedural grounds. Again, while these legal
issues were involved with actual cases involving
vaccinations, we can plausibly extend them to
anticipate how they would address technologies
and procedures that are more clearly human enhancement than therapy.

OPERATIONS
Beyond the demands of international and domestic law, military enhancements will likely have
important policy implications. We will examine
here some of those implications on military operations themselves. Cognitive and physical human
enhancements can significantly help a military
achieve its missions, operate more efficiently
and perhaps ethically, as well as a host of other
benefits. But our focus here will be on unintended
problems that may be caused by enhancements.
Assuming that enhancements are not adopted
by all warfighters at once—for instance, they are
rolled out selectively or slowly for safety, economic, or other reasons—there would instantly be
an inequality among the ranks, creating problems
for unit cohesion. Some warfighters will be privileged (or unlucky?) enough to be appropriately
enhanced for their mission, whereas some others
may be underenhanced, while others yet will
remain “normal.” In broader society, we see that
uneven access to technology creates a gap between
the haves and the have-nots, such as the Internet
divide (Rozner 1998); and this translates into a
difference in quality of life, education, earnings,
and so on. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect
a similar effect within the military.
At the unit level, enhancements may cause (or
increase) dissension between warfighters. A mix
of enhanced and unenhanced warfighters within a

single unit may affect morale and unit cohesion.
To be sure, similar worries had been voiced related to the integration of different ethnic groups,
religions, and sexual orientation in the military
(Canaday, 2001); but where these differences do
not intrinsically imply different levels of capabilities or merit that would matter operationally, human enhancements do. By definition, an enhanced
warfighter would be stronger, faster, or otherwise
better enabled than their normal counterparts.
This means they could accept riskier roles and
have lower support requirements, for instance.
Further, because enhanced warfighters represent a significant investment of research and
effort, they may be treated quite differently from
‘normal’ warfighters, e.g., perhaps they will not
be subjected to the hard work of routine fighting
or other “mundane” uses. For comparison, many
Allied airborne troops in World War II were pulled
from the lines after the D-Day invasion of Normandy, rather than being required to slog through
France and the Hürtgen Forest in Germany. The
asymmetry of needs and capabilities could cause
resentment of the unenhanced or underenhanced
as a drag on capabilities and operational efficiency
of the enhanced, as well as resentment by the
others of the superior abilities and (likely) superior status of the enhanced. To some extent, we
already witness this when militaries switch their
dependence from soldiers to “special operators”
such as Navy SEALs. The asymmetry could also
create a sense of entitlement among the enhanced
and undermine an esprit de corps, much as some
superstars do on sports teams.
Morale is also relevant to confidence in command. Enhancements could create novel difficulties for the command structure, particularly
if commanders were unenhanced and were seen
as physically—or, worse, intellectually—inferior
to those they command. To take one firsthand
perspective, retired US Army Brigadier General
Richard O’Meara asserts that a social contract
exists between troops and leaders, one that places
the burden of defining the goals of a mission on
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the leaders, and the burden of accomplishment on
the troops (O’Meara, 2012). But while the troops
have the responsibility to accomplish the goals
that command has set forth, they also have a right
to demand that leaders make informed decisions,
even if difficult ones, and to do so in a way that
warfighters recognize as legitimate. It is a recipe
for disaster when those further down the chain of
command are continually second-guessing and
evading their orders. If human enhancement exacerbates that lack of confidence in leaders, it could
undermine the strategy and tactics of command.
Physical enhancements may be less problematic in this regard than cognitive ones, at least
with respect to challenges to command. When the
troops are generally less educated, less interested
in strategy, and more concerned with communal
rather than individual rights and values, command
can worry less about the potential disobedience
that could result from enhancements. Generally
speaking, the primary responsibility of typical
enlisted soldiers is to know at all times what their
superiors desire of them; their well being, even
their survival, may well depend on it. Therefore,
the rank-and-file are typically extremely sensitive to the wishes of command and, even when
those wishes are not officially communicated,
there is an expectation that a soldier will “get
it” and learn to read the signs and comply, or
disregard at their peril. Further, military culture
is based on the assumption that the decisions of
leadership are entitled to greater weight based
on superior knowledge and judgment. Diffusing
the power to make decisions strikes at the heart
of the legitimacy of leadership; and so cognitive
enhancements pose dangers to received military
models that mere physical enhancements do not.
There are further implications for service,
pay, and conditions. Perhaps we should think
about enhanced warfighters as we do with other
specially trained operators, such as the Army’s
Special Forces or Navy SEALs. That is, military
policy could be to keep the enhanced separated
from the unenhanced, in special or elite units; this
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would reduce any friction between the two groups.
However, this segregation may merely telescope
the problem out to a broader level, shifting tension from within units to among different units:
if special units are given access to enhancements,
or otherwise treated or rewarded differently—assuming we can even think of enhancements as
rewards—then other units may feel slighted.
But as we alluded to above, it may be an open
question of whether a particular enhancement
may be a benefit to the individual. Leaving disenhancements aside, some or many enhancements
pose side-effect risks; for instance, we still do not
adequately understand the role of sleep and longterm effects of sleep deprivation, even if we can
engineer a warfighter to operate on very little or no
(true) sleep, as some animals are already capable
of doing. So depending on one’s perspective, an
enhancement could be a reward or benefit, or it
could be an undesired risk, as some believed about
anthrax vaccinations (Wasserman & Grabenstein,
2003; Berkelman, Halsey, & Resnik, 2012).
How, then, should enhancements affect the
service commitment of military personnel? Insofar as an enhancement is costly to develop and
represents an investment, it may be reasonable
to expect the enhanced warfighter to commit to
longer service. But if an enhancement is seen more
as a mere risk, then perhaps a shorter length of
service is appropriate for the enhanced. Similar
decisions may need to be made with respect to
pay, promotions, and so on. For instance, if promotions and “danger pay” may be used to incentivize volunteers, enhanced soldiers could be better
positioned and more likely to accept dangerous
missions in exchange for those benefits.
On the mission side of operations, human
enhancements may elicit a backlash that hinders
the mission and therefore detracts from the value
of enhancements for the military. This kind of
blowback is already seen with the US government’s use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
in the so-called “drone wars”: While the US views
its target strikes as appropriate—if not ethically
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required—to the extent that it is taking American
military personnel out of harm’s way in a presumably just campaign, adversaries often see drones
as an unfair, cowardly, and dishonorable proxy
for a military afraid to engage face-to-face with
human resistance (Galliott, forthcoming). This
sentiment seems to fuel resentment and hatred
toward the US, which in turn may help to recruit
more terrorists (Foust, 2012; Plaw, 2012).
Similarly, if adversaries regard military enhancements as unfair, cowardly or abominable,
they may be counterproductive to the larger war
effort and perhaps encourage the enemy to resort
to more conventional but very much despicable
means (Galliott, 2012a). This is not to say that war
should be a “fair fight.” Indeed, the whole idea of
employing emerging technologies is to leverage
force and confer some military advantage. However, as with drone strikes, states must carefully
think about the consequences of enhancing soldiers
in terms of possible retaliatory options, and such
considerations may preclude the employment of
such means in the first instance (Galliott, 2012b).
Another criticism of the drone wars that may
be applied to military enhancements is the charge
that these technologies, by better ensuring the survival and success of our own military personnel,
serve to make war more risk-free and therefore
a more palatable option (Lin, Abney, & Bekey,
2008; Lin, 2010; Lin, 2011; Galliott, forthcoming; Human Rights Watch, 2012). That is, we
may be tempted into choosing a military option
during a political conflict, rather than saving war
as the last resort as demanded by traditional just
war theory. This ethical imperative is reflected in
Civil War General Robert E. Lee’s observation:
“It is well that war is so terrible; otherwise, we
would grow too fond of it” (Cooke, 1876, p. 184;
Levin, 2008). As war becomes less terrible—at
least for our own side—our natural aversions to
it may be lessened as well.
This criticism leads to other related charges
such as that drones are making it easier to wage
war secretly, thus subverting democratic require-

ments, e.g., any due process afforded to targets
that are US citizens and the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (50 USC §1541-1548). To the extent
that enhancements can make it easier for military
teams to covertly conduct missions and penetrate
enemy lines, it would likewise be easier to conduct illegal operations, such as assassinations and
cross-border attacks without the permission of the
receiving nation-state.

ETHICS
In the above two sections, we have identified the
key challenges that military human enhancement
may pose to law, operations, and related policy.
In this final section, we briefly discuss a range
of other implications that fall broadly under the
banner of “ethics.”

Character and Virtue
In recent decades, virtue ethics has enjoyed a broad
resurgence of interest by scholars, applying the
Aristotelian moral framework to environmental
ethics, business ethics, bioethics, medical, and
legal ethics (Oakley & Cocking, 2001; Sandler &
Cafaro, 2005; Walker & Ivanhoe, 2007). Virtue
ethics is often thought of as uniquely suitable for
professional ethics, so given that the military is
one of the professions, it should not surprise us
that virtue ethics has been recognized as having
core applications here as well. Indeed, virtue ethics
has arguably been an integral component of thinking about military ethics for millennia, insofar as
reference to virtues (e.g., courage, honor, loyalty,
and justice) is an enduring feature of ethical discourse in the military tradition (Olsthoorn, 2010).
Virtue ethical frameworks are also being applied to the unique ethical challenges presented by
emerging military technologies, such as autonomous robots and drones (Lin, Abney, & Bekey,
2012; Enemark, 2013). We can extend that trend
to consider the ethical implications that military
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enhancements may have with respect to the moral
virtues. First, let us briefly clarify what we mean
by “virtues” in the ethical context that concerns
us here. In most ethical theories in which virtues
play a central role, moral virtues are understood
to be states of a person’s character, which we have
already said are stable dispositions that promote
that person’s reliable performance of right or
excellent actions. Such actions, when the result
of genuine virtue, imply the praiseworthiness of
the person performing them. In human beings,
virtues of character are not gifts of birth or passive
circumstance; they are cultivated states that lead
to a person’s deliberate and reasoned choice of the
good. They result from habitual and committed
practice and study of right actions, and they imply
an alignment of the agent’s feelings, beliefs, desires
and perceptions in ways that are consistently found
to be appropriate to the various practical contexts
in which the person is called to act.
Thus, virtues of character are conceived as
personal “excellences” in their own right; their
value is not exhausted in the good actions they
promote. When properly integrated, individual
virtues contribute to a moral agent’s possession
of “virtue” writ large; that is, they motivate us to
describe a person as virtuous, rather than merely
noting their embodiment of a particular virtue such
as courage, honesty or justice. States of a person’s
character contrary to virtue are characterized as
vices, and a person whose character is dominated
by vice is therefore appropriately characterized
as vicious.
A virtuous person is conceived as good, they
are also understood to be moving toward the accomplishment of a good, flourishing or excellent
life; that is, they are living well. While the cultivation of virtue does not aim at securing the agent’s
own flourishing independently of the flourishing
of others (it is not egoistic in this sense), the
successful cultivation of a virtuous character is
conceptually inseparable from the possibility of
a good life for the agent. Yet the way this good
is achieved in action cannot be fixed by a set of
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advance rules or principles, but must be continually discerned by the agent herself in a manner
that is adapted to the particular practical contexts
and roles she occupies. This contextual element
sets virtue ethics clearly apart from utilitarian
and deontological frameworks, and it explains
why virtue ethics is so useful for application to
the military profession.
Virtue ethics presupposes that the appropriate actions of a courageous soldier in battle, for
example, will be very different from those of a
courageous teacher or courageous politician, and
from how the soldier displays courage at home in
civilian life. The virtuous agent is “prudentially
wise,” meaning that she is able to readily see what
moral responses different situations call for, and
she can adapt her conduct accordingly in a way
that nevertheless reflects her unified character as
a virtuous individual. What, then, are the implications of military enhancements for the ability of
warfighters to cultivate and express virtue? What
follows does not exhaust the topics of potential
concern about military enhancement and virtue,
but merely an overview of the issues that are likely
to matter most from a virtue-ethical standpoint.
We should start by questioning what counts
as a “virtuous” enhancement. Many proposed
enhancements might be viewed as ways to directly
enhance military virtue itself. For example, if a
pill, subdermal implant, or genetic alteration can
make warfighters more willing to expose themselves to risk of harm, doesn’t the enhancement
make them more courageous? Yet this is too simple
an analysis. From the moral standpoint, a trait or
disposition is not a virtue just because it happens
to result in appropriate actions. Virtuous actions
must also emanate from the person’s own moral
viewpoint, that is, from his or her way of seeing
and judging the ethical and practical implications
of a situation. Otherwise the actions, however
desirable from an institutional point of view, are
not creditable to the moral character and wisdom
of the agent. Thus if virtue and character matter
in military ethics (note this assumes that we have
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gone beyond narrowly utilitarian considerations,
such as risk-benefit calculations), then it very
much matters how an enhancement modifies
warfighters, not just how it affects their behavior.
For example, a pill that suppresses common
physiologically-rooted panic reactions in battle
looks compatible with virtue, if those reactions
would otherwise undermine the soldier’s training, expertise and rational grasp of the situation.
Consider a soldier who successfully cultivates
the thoughts, desires and feelings that are fitting
for an excellent soldier in battle, but whose actions in the field are still hampered by autonomic
symptoms of alarm beyond his or her control (e.g.,
shortness of breath, dangerously elevated pulse).
Such a person could be aided in courage by an
enhancement that short-circuits those symptoms.
Yet if the enhancement leads a soldier to act in
ways that contradict a cognitive grasp of what’s
appropriate (e.g., “I knew it was too risky to engage
that truck convoy without better reconnaissance,
but for some reason I just did it anyway”), then the
enhancement is actually an impediment to courage, in this case promoting the contrary vice of
rashness. Alternatively, if the enhancement elicits
apparently courageous actions from a soldier who
continues to have seriously inappropriate feelings, attitudes, and judgments about battlefield
risk, we would not say that the outcome of the
enhancement is a courageous or “good” soldier;
we have merely boosted the utility of a bad one.
Enhancements of this sort would be problematic
not only in particular cases, but also because they
could interfere more generally with the ethical
habituation of virtuous soldiers, who become
prudentially wise actors only by habitually learning
to see situations correctly and develop appropriate
responses and strategies for dealing with them. If
enhancements come to be used as a substitute for
that learning process, they will actually hinder
the cultivation of prudent, courageous and good
soldiers, according to virtue ethics.
The issue of reversibility of enhancements is
relevant here too. Since virtue presupposes the
cognitive or affective flexibility to adapt behavior

to circumstance and social context, an enhancement that “set” an agent’s behavior patterns in a
certain mode, or otherwise made his or her reaction patterns less adaptable (e.g., to civilian life
or peacetime operations) would inhibit the ability
to function virtuously and, by extension, to lead
a good life. Even temporary enhancements could
introduce this problem if they prevent the soldier
from adapting well to the emerging exigencies of
battle. A virtuous soldier is one who can immediately “dial down” the targeted desire to kill the
enemy when a crowd of children unpredictably
enters the field of action.
Virtue ethics also requires us to consider the
potential impact of enhancements on moral leadership in military life. Most virtue ethicists acknowledge that fully virtuous agents who cultivate and
display moral wisdom in all of their professional
and personal roles are usually a significant minority in any population: it’s not easy to be virtuous.
Therefore, one of the most important social and
professional functions of the virtuous person is to
serve as a moral example to which others aspire
and strive to emulate. In the context of military
life, this function is largely imputed to the officer
corps. Enlisted soldiers are certainly recognized
for exemplary acts of courage and valor, but as
in any profession, complete military virtue is
thought to require not only fine actions but also
much experience, as well as mature reflection upon
the goals and ideals of the profession—something
officer training can provide.
This invites a novel set of ethical questions
about enhancements, some recurring throughout
this report: Will they be given to officers, or just
combat soldiers? Will they erect a moral divide
between the military ranks? Who will have greater
“moral authority” and status as ethical exemplars:
enhanced or unenhanced military personnel?
How will enhancement impact the process of
military education? Would an unenhanced officer’s lessons on cultivating courage or fortitude
over a lifetime of service be relevant to a soldier
artificially enhanced for these qualities? There are
also important questions about how enhancement
149
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might affect perceptions of military character by
civilians and by unenhanced forces abroad; for
example, will enhanced soldiers encounter less
goodwill or greater resistance from those who see
their status as antithetical to traditional ideals of
military virtue and character?
Finally, ethical concerns with military enhancement do not end with the question of what it means
to be a good soldier; they extend to what it means
to be a good human being. There is a debate among
virtue ethicists about whether virtue is rooted in
a distinctive conception of what, if anything, a
human should naturally be. Aristotle certainly
thought so, but some modern virtue ethicists deny
this (Swanton 2003; Slote 2011). Still, most virtue
ethicists believe that what is ethical for a human
is inseparable from what is appropriate to human
development on the whole. If they are right, then
enhancements that take us too far from what is
distinctively human are morally problematic in
their own right. That said, enhancements that
introduce non-natural physiology like the ability
to eat grass or forgo sleep would be of far less
concern to a virtue ethicist than enhancements
that warp the distinctive moral, emotional and
intellectual capacities that underpin virtue of
character. For example, a pill or neural implant
that disrupted or diminished a soldier’s overall
capacity to experience grief, guilt, compassion,
curiosity, creativity, critical reflection or love
would be highly problematic from a virtue-ethical
standpoint (Nussbaum, 2011).

Emotion and Honour
Related to the issue of military virtues and professionalism is the question of what role emotions
and honor, or codes of ethics, play in warfighters.
With human enhancements, military organizations may elevate or diminish emotions and other
psychological dispositions in their operators for
some immediate benefit, but we also need to
consider broader effects. Questions in this area
include: does participation in any war, regardless of whether one’s own side of the conflict’s
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participation fulfills just war theory criteria, damages one’s humanity? What does killing do to the
psychological, spiritual, and emotional health of
the warrior? What effect would human enhancements have with respect to that health?
Some scholars and clinicians assert that any
violence against another human being causes the
perpetrator psychological damage, even if the
actions were taken undeniably in self-defense.
Rachel MacNair, clinical psychologist and author
of Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress: The
Psychological Consequences of Killing, describes
the dangers of taking another human life:
All of these things—anxiety, panic, depression,
substance abuse—can also be included in the
‘psychological consequences’ of killing, along
with such things as increased paranoia or a sense
of disintegration, or dissociation or amnesia at
the time of the trauma itself. In the case of killing, feelings of guilt can vary widely, from killing
that is not socially approved, such as criminal
homicide, to killing that is not only approved but
also expected, such as soldiers in war. People can
feel guilty even under circumstances that involve
clear self-defense.... [S]evere PTSD can be suffered without any feelings of guilt at all, and guilt
can be suffered without any symptoms of PTSD
(MacNair, 2002).
The warfighters’ code of honor plays a key role
in preserving their mental health, in addition to
preventing atrocities. As French explains in The
Code of the Warrior (French, 2003): Murder is
a good example of an act that is cross-culturally
condemned. Whatever their other points of discord, the major religions of the world agree in
the determination that murder (variously defined)
is wrong. Unfortunately, the fact that we abhor
murder produces a disturbing tension for those
who are asked to fight wars for their tribes, clans,
communities, cultures or nations. When they are
trained for war, warriors are given a mandate by
their society to take lives. But they must learn to
take only certain lives in certain ways, at certain
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times, and for certain reasons. Otherwise, they
become indistinguishable from murderers and will
find themselves condemned by the very societies
they were created to serve.
Warrior cultures throughout history and from
diverse regions around the globe have constructed
codes of behavior, based on that culture’s image
of the ideal warrior. These codes have not always
been written down or literally codified into a set
of explicit rules. A code can be hidden in the lines
of epic poems or implied by the descriptions of
mythic heroes. One way or another, it is carefully
conveyed to each succeeding generation of warriors. These codes tend to be quite demanding.
They are often closely linked to a culture’s religious beliefs and can be connected to elaborate
(and frequently death defying or excruciatingly
painful) rituals and rites of passage.
In many cases this code of honor seems to hold
the warrior to a higher ethical standard than that
required for an ordinary citizen within the general
population of the society the warrior serves. The
code is not imposed from the outside. The warriors themselves police strict adherence to these
standards; with violators being shamed, ostracized,
or even killed by their peers.
The code of the warrior not only defines how
he should interact with his own warrior comrades,
but also how he should treat other members of his
society, his enemies, and the people he conquers.
The code restrains the warrior. It sets boundaries
on his behavior. It distinguishes honorable acts
from shameful acts.
But why do warriors need a code that ties
their hands and limits their options? Why should
a warrior culture want to restrict the actions of
its members and require them to commit to lofty
ideals? Might not such restraints cripple their
effectiveness as warriors? What’s wrong with,
“All’s fair in love and war?” Isn’t winning all that
matters? Are concerns about honor and shame
burdens to the warrior? And, again, what is the
interplay between cognitive enhancements and
this code of honor?

One reason for such warriors’ codes may be to
protect the warrior himself (or herself) from serious psychological damage. To say the least, the
things that warriors are asked to do to guarantee
their cultures’ survival are far from pleasant. Even
those few who, for whatever reason, seem to feel
no revulsion at spilling another human being’s guts
on the ground, severing a limb, slicing off a head,
or burning away a face are likely to be affected by
the sight of their friends or kinsmen suffering the
same fate. The combination of the warriors’ own
natural disgust at what they must witness in battle
and the fact that what they must do to endure and
conquer can seem so uncivilized, so against what
they have been taught by their society, creates the
conditions for even the most accomplished warriors to feel tremendous self-loathing.
In the introduction to his valuable analysis of
Vietnam veterans suffering from post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), Achilles in Vietnam:
Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character,
psychiatrist and author Jonathan Shay stresses
the importance of “understanding...the specific
nature of catastrophic war experiences that not
only cause lifelong disabling psychiatric symptoms
but can ruin good character” (Shay, 1994). Shay
has conducted countless personal interviews and
therapy sessions with American combat veterans
who are part of the Veterans Improvement Program
(VIP). His work has led him to the conclusion that
the most severe cases of PTSD are the result of
wartime experiences that are not simply violent,
but which involve what Shay terms the “betrayal
of ‘what’s right’” (Shay, 1994). Veterans who
believe that they were directly or indirectly party
to immoral or dishonorable behavior (perpetrated
by themselves, their comrades, or their commanders) have the hardest time reclaiming their lives
after the war is over. Such men may be tortured by
persistent nightmares, may have trouble discerning a safe environment from a threatening one,
may not be able to trust their friends, neighbors,
family members, or government, and many have
problems with alcohol, drugs, child or spousal
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abuse, depression, and suicidal tendencies. As
Shay sorrowfully concludes, “The painful paradox
is that fighting for one’s country can render one
unfit to be its citizen” (Shay, 1994).
Warriors need a way to distinguish what they
must do out of a sense of duty from what a serial
killer does for the sheer sadistic pleasure of it. Their
actions, like those of the serial killer, set them
apart from the rest of society. Warriors, however,
are not sociopaths. They respect the values of
the society in which they were raised and which
they are prepared to die to protect. Therefore, it is
important for them to conduct themselves in such
a way that they will be honored and esteemed by
their communities, not reviled and rejected by
them. They want to be seen as proud defenders
and representatives of what is best about their
culture: as heroes, not “baby-killers.”
In a sense, the nature of the warrior’s profession puts him or her at a higher risk for moral
corruption than most other occupations because
it involves exerting power in matters of life and
death. Warriors exercise the power to take or
save lives, order others to take or save lives, and
lead or send others to their deaths. If they take
this awesome responsibility too lightly—if they
lose sight of the moral significance of their actions—they risk losing their humanity and their
ability to flourish in human society.
In his powerful work, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and
Society, Lt. Col. Dave Grossman illuminates the
process by which those in war and those training
for war attempt to achieve emotional distance
from their enemies. The practice of dehumanizing the enemy through the use of abusive or
euphemistic language is a common and effective
tool for increasing aggression and breaking down
inhibitions against killing:
It is so much easier to kill someone if they look
distinctly different than you. If your propaganda
machine can convince your soldiers that their
opponents are not really human but are ‘inferior
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forms of life,’ then their natural resistance to killing their own species will be reduced. Often the
enemy’s humanity is denied by referring to him
as a ‘gook,’ ‘Kraut,’ or ‘Nip’ (Grossman, 1996).
Like Shay, Grossman has interviewed many US
veterans of the Vietnam War. Not all of his subjects,
however, were those with lingering psychological
trauma. Grossman found that some of the men he
interviewed had never truly achieved emotional
distance from their former foes, and seemed to be
the better for it. These men expressed admiration
for Vietnamese culture. Some had even married
Vietnamese women. They appeared to be leading
happy and productive post-war lives. In contrast,
those who persisted in viewing the Vietnamese
as “less than animals” were unable to leave the
war behind them.
Grossman writes about the dangers of dehumanizing the enemy in terms of potential damage
to the war effort, long-term political fallout, and
regional or global instability:
Because of [our] ability to accept other cultures,
Americans probably committed fewer atrocities
than most other nations would have under the
circumstances associated with guerrilla warfare
in Vietnam. Certainly fewer than was the track
record of most colonial powers. Yet still we had
our My Lai, and our efforts in that war were
profoundly, perhaps fatally, undermined by that
single incident. It can be easy to unleash this genie
of racial and ethnic hatred in order to facilitate
killing in time of war. It can be more difficult to
keep the cork in the bottle and completely restrain
it. Once it is out, and the war is over, the genie
is not easily put back in the bottle. Such hatred
lingers over the decades, even centuries, as can
be seen today in Lebanon and what was once
Yugoslavia (Grossman, 1996).
The insidious harm brought to the individual
warriors who find themselves swept up by such
devastating propaganda matters a great deal to
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those concerned with the warriors’ own welfare.
In a segment on the “Clinical Importance of
Honoring or Dishonoring the Enemy,” Jonathan
Shay describes an intimate connection between
the psychological health of the veteran and the
respect he feels for those he fought. He stresses
how important it is to the warrior to have the
conviction that he participated in an honorable
endeavor:
Restoring honor to the enemy is an essential
step in recovery from combat PTSD. While other
things are obviously needed as well, the veteran’s
self-respect never fully recovers so long as he is
unable to see the enemy as worthy. In the words
of one of our patients, a war against subhuman
vermin ‘has no honor.’ This is true even in victory; in defeat, the dishonoring absence of human themis (shared values, a common sense of
‘what’s right’) linking enemy to enemy makes life
unendurable”(Shay, 1994).
Shay finds echoes of these sentiments in the
words of J. Glenn Gray from Gray’s modern
classic on the experience of war, The Warriors:
Reflections on Men in Battle. With the struggle
of the Allies against the Japanese in the Pacific
Theater of World War II as his backdrop, Gray
brings home the agony of the warrior who has
become incapable of honoring his enemies and
thus is unable to find redemption himself:
The ugliness of a war against an enemy conceived
to be subhuman can hardly be exaggerated. There
is an unredeemed quality to battle experienced
under these conditions, which blunts all senses
and perceptions. Traditional appeals of war are
corroded by the demands of a war of extermination, where conventional rules no longer apply.
For all its inhumanity, war is a profoundly human
institution....This image of the enemy as beast
lessens even the satisfaction in destruction, for
there is no proper regard for the worth of the object
destroyed....The joys of comradeship, keenness of

perception, and sensual delights [are] lessened....
No aesthetic reconciliation with one’s fate as a
warrior [is] likely because no moral purgation
[is] possible (Gray, 1998).
By setting standards of behavior for themselves,
accepting certain restraints, and even “honoring
their enemies,” warriors can create a lifeline that
will allow them to pull themselves out of the
hell of war and reintegrate themselves into their
society, should they survive to see peace restored.
A warrior’s code may cover everything from the
treatment of prisoners of war to oath keeping to
table etiquette, but its primary purpose is to grant
nobility to the warriors’ profession. This allows
warriors to retain both their self-respect and
the respect of those they guard (French, 2003).
Cognitive enhancements, then, would operate
against this complex and subtle background to
effects that may be psychologically disastrous or
difficult to predict.

Broader Impacts
From the preceding, we can see that concerns
about military enhancements can be focused
inward, toward the health and character of the
human subject. But these concerns can also ripple
outward, focused beyond the human subject.
These issues engage law, policy, and ethics; for
instance, how do enhancements impact military
operations, including how adversaries might respond? But since enhancements change the human
person—the basic unit of society—we can expect
changes and challenges beyond such first-order and
second-order effects. These broader impacts are
temporally more distant and therefore tend to be
discounted; but they are nevertheless foreseeable
and should also be considered ahead of rapidly
advancing science and technology.
First, we can expect the proliferation of perhaps
every military technology we invent, as history
shows. For instance, besides WWII-era Jeeps and
modern-day Humvees returned to society as better-
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polished civilian models, and GPS was directly
adopted by society without any modification (Lin,
2010). The method of diffusion would be different and more direct with enhancements, though:
most warfighters return to society as civilians (our
veterans) and would carry back any permanent
enhancements and addictions with them. Again,
the US has about 23 million veterans, or one out
of every 10 adults, in addition to 3 million active
and reserve personnel (US Census, 2011), so this
is a significant segment of the population. Would
these enhancements—such as a drug or an operation that subdues emotions—create problems for
the veteran to assimilate to civilian life? What kinds
of pressures and how much, including healthcare
costs, would be placed on the Department of Veteran Affairs, given military enhancements, and
are we prepared to handle those costs?
Proliferation into society is not limited to
our own borders, but we can expect it to occur
internationally, again as history shows. Even
the military robotics that have been deployed in
war only within the last decade are not just a US
phenomenon, as much as it may seem from the
international media’s focus. It is reported that more
than 50 nations now have or are developing military
robotics, including China and Iran (Singer, 2009;
Sharkey, 2011). Where the US deploys robots for
their considerable advantages in surveillance,
strike, and other roles, we would be unprepared
to receive the same treatment if (and when) it is
inflicted upon us. With nuclear weapons, while
the US had the first-mover advantage, proliferation
pushed us toward non-use agreements and erased
much of that advantage (International Atomic
Energy Agency, 1970). Likewise with military
enhancements (and robotics), we can expect other
nations to develop or adopt the same technologies
we develop and therefore, at some point, have the
same capabilities, again diminishing the competitive benefits once derived from the enhancements.
The wider impact of military enhancements
echoes those already identified in the rich literature
on human enhancements generally, for instance:

154

would enhanced veterans—say, with bionic limbs
and augmented cognition—put other civilians at
a competitive disadvantage with respect to jobs,
school, sports, and so on? Would this create an
enhancement arms race beyond steroids, as is now
starting in sports? If enhanced veterans (and the
other enhanced people they inspire) live longer
than usual, does that put undue burdens on social
security and pension funds? Would these advantages create social pressures to enhance more
generally, as we are witnessing with Modafinil—a
cognitive enhancer—in both the classroom and
the workplace?
Relatedly, would enhanced warfighters be bad
role models, such as steroid-using athletes, for
children? We can expect some children will want
to enhance themselves, and some will succeed.
But this seems bad insofar as their bodies are still
developing and anyway don’t have full intellectual
or legal capacity to make informed life-altering
decisions (e.g., tattoos). Enhancements, as distinct
from purely therapeutic uses, would likely not
have been tested on normal children and other
populations, such as pregnant women and those
of advanced age, in that it may be too risky to
conduct such testing on those healthy individuals,
relative to the benefits. That is, there would be
no countervailing benefit of helping to cure the
individual of an illness, if those subjects were
normal to begin with.
Earlier, we discussed the issue of access to
enhancements within the military: who should
receive them, some warfighters or all; and what
problems could unequal access create? At a larger
societal scale, there may be friction between the
enhanced and unenhanced, or at least a class divide—in terms of education, job outlook, etc.—as
we already see between those with Internet access
and those without. If enhancements in society are
expensive and only afforded by the wealthier,
then this may widen the gap between the haves
and the have-nots. Similarly, would there be a
communication divide between the enhanced and
unenhanced, if the former can see in different
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wavelengths and have different powers of perception? On the other hand, if there’s no moral issue
generally with enhancing humans, then why not
uplift animals closer to human-level intelligence
(Dvorsky, 2012), building on chimera work previously discussed?
While neither international nor domestic law
requires that we consider these and other societal
effects, ethics and public policy do. Without proper
management, technological disruptions can have
serious, avoidable effects. Possible solutions, as
suggested for other issues previously considered,
may include a policy to implement only reversible or temporary enhancements in the military
as a firewall for broader society. To be sure, some
commentators do not view enhancements in the
general population as a bad or unmanageable
outcome. So this continuing wider debate on human enhancements—which we will not explicate
here, as it is available elsewhere (Allhoff et al.,
2010a)—should be of interest to the military,
especially as the military is a key driver of new
technologies that eventually make their way into
broader society.

CONCLUSION
Human enhancements have the potential to make
it easier and safer for warfighters to do their job.
Enhancements have a long history in the military,
but recent opposition to their use in realms such
as sports and academia, as well as controversy
over the off-label or experimental use of certain
drugs by the military, are forcing questions about
the appropriateness of their use by the military.
While military enhancements have largely escaped
the scrutiny of the public as well as policymakers,
the science and technologies underwriting human
enhancements are marching ahead.
The military technology getting the most attention now is robotics. As we suggested throughout
the report, there may be ethical, legal, and policy
parallels between robotics and enhancements, and

certainly more lessons can be drawn. We can think
of military robotics as sharing the same goal as
human enhancement. Robotics may aim to create
a super soldier from an engineering approach:
they are our proxy mecha-warriors. However,
there are some important limitations to those
machines. For one thing, they don’t have a sense
of ethics—of what is right and wrong—which
can be essential on the battlefield and to the laws
of war. Where it is child’s play to identify a ball
or coffee mug or a gun, it’s notoriously tough for
a computer to do that, especially objects that are
novel or otherwise unlabeled (Le et al., 2012).
This does not give us much confidence that a
robot can reliably distinguish friend from foe, at
least in the foreseeable future.
In contrast, cognitive and physical enhancements aim to create a super-soldier from a biomedical direction, such as with drugs and bionics. For
battle, we want our soft organic bodies to perform
more like machines. Somewhere in between robotics and biomedical research, we might arrive at the
perfect future warfighter: one that is part machine
and part human, striking a formidable balance
between technology and our frailties. Indeed,
the field of neuromorphic robots already aims to
fill this gap by using biological brains to control
robotic bodies (Krichmar & Wagatsuma, 2011).
In changing human biology with enhancements, we also may be changing the assumptions
behind existing laws of war and even human ethics.
If so, we would need to reexamine the foundations
of our social and political institutions—including
the military—if prevailing norms create “policy
vacuums” (Moor 2005) in failing to account for
new technologies (Lin, 2012b; Lin, Allhoff, &
Rowe, 2012; Taddeo, 2012).
In comic books and science fiction, we can
suspend disbelief about the details associated
with fantastical technologies and abilities, as
represented by human enhancements. But in
the real world—as life imitates art, and “mutant
powers” really are changing the world—the details matter and will require real investigations.

155


Super Soldiers (Part 2)

The issues discussed in this report are complex,
given an unfamiliar interplay among technology
ethics, bioethics, military law, and other relevant
areas. As such, further studies will require close
collaborations with a range of disciplines and
stakeholders, as is increasingly the case in technology ethics (Brey, 2000). Given the pervasive
role of national security and defense in the modern
world in particular, as well as the flow of military
technologies into civilian society, many of these
issues are urgent now and need to be actively
engaged, ideally in advance of or in parallel with
rapidly emerging science and technologies.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Disenhancement: A medical or biological
intervention that makes one worse off.
Miltiary-Technical Proliferation: The spread
of military technologies into the civilian realm.
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Principle of Distinction: An element of international law and just war theory which demands
that a weapon must be discriminating enough to
target only combatants and never noncombatants.
Principle of Proportionality: Demands that
the use of a weapon be proportional to the military objective, so as to keep civilian casualties
to a minimum.
SIrUS Principle: Related to proportionality in
that it requires methods of attack to be minimally
harmful in rendering a warfighter hors de combat
or unable to fight.
Soldier Enhancement: Medical or biological intervention introduced into a soldier’s body
designed to improve warfighting performance,
appearance, or capability besides what is necessary to achieve, sustain or restore health.
Therapy: An intervention or treatment intended to alleviate a condition suffered by a patient,
elevating his or health closer to normal.

